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Abstract
This article proposes a model of anthropocentric ocean connectivity based on the concept of human 
perspective as location. Within this location, anthropocentrism can be, but is not necessarily, an 
exclusive or dominant valuation of the human. In fact, conceptions of both anthropocentrism and of 
ocean connectivity are pluralistic. These and other pluralisms are borne out in this article’s content 
and structure, which takes the form of explorations of anthropocentric connectivity in relation to 
four specific ocean-related human activities. First, Jan Solski applies understandings of connectivity 
as “flow” in the context of strategic ocean geopolitics. Second, Iva Parlov analyzes current doctrinal 
issues and interactions at the international level with respect to the legal regime for places of refuge 
for ships in need of assistance. Third, Maria Madalena das Neves examines ocean connectivity in the 
context of transboundary energy trade and market integration, with particular attention to geopolit-
ical and ecological connectivity. Finally, Julia Gaunce proposes that the making and application of 
transnational rules and standards for ships in polar waters enhances certain connections and disrupts 
others, to the detriment of oceans and people, and that broadening connectivity especially in respect 
of Arctic Indigenous people(s) could help address challenges faced by oceans and ocean governance.
Keywords: ocean connectivity, ocean governance, anthropocentrism(s), human activity, 
plurality
Responsible Editor: Margherita Paola Poto, UiT The Arctic University of Norway
Received: June 2021; Accepted: August 2021; Published: November 2021 
1 Model’s characteristics
It could be said that every human understanding – including every understanding of 
law and ocean connectivity – is both anthropogenic, by definition, and anthropocen-
tric, i.e. from a human perspective, for better or for worse.1 At the same time, human 
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perspectives are not limited to valuing the human and exploiting nature.2 In  this 
spirit, and for the purpose of this article, anthropocentrism is considered to be not 
so much a valuation as a general location, a perspective that can and often does, but 
does not necessarily, prioritize the human at the expense of all else. 
A plurality of ocean connectivity concepts resides here, concepts which are argu-
ably as varied as humans, cultures, or expertise. However, this article focuses on 
anthropocentric ocean connectivity concepts manifested in four broad areas of 
human activity – human activity being the other defining aspect of “anthropocen-
tric” in this article. These areas of human activity are: strategic ocean geopolitics, 
international legal approaches to places of refuge for ships in need of assistance, 
ocean energy-transfer, and the making and applying of rules and standards for ships. 
Two parts follow this introduction. The first part takes the form of four different 
considerations of anthropocentric ocean connectivity. Each consideration focusses 
on one of the four areas of human activity noted above, touching on concepts, 
problems and promises of anthropocentric connectivity. This part is followed by 
a concluding reflection on how anthropocentric ocean connectivity might address 
systemic challenges faced by oceans and ocean governance.
2 Anthropocentric ocean connectivity in four areas of human activity
This section contemplates different aspects of anthropocentric ocean connectivity, 
and its problems and promises with respect to systemic material, epistemic and geo-
political challenges to oceans and ocean governance, in the context of four different 
areas of human activity.
2.1 Anthropocentric connectivity in strategic ocean geopolitics
Although the practice of connectivity itself is as old as human interactions, the emer-
gence of connectivity as a strategy with geopolitical implications is a novel approach.3 
In fact, connectivity has been described as one of the “key issues and policy trends 
of our century”.4 Nadine Godehardt and Karoline Postel-Vinay stress the strategic 
dimension of connectivity, which differentiates it from connections built randomly or 
opportunistically.5 The very notion of a ‘strategy’ implies the existence of an actor(s) 
with the willingness to dedicate a set of actions (use of resources at their disposal) to 
obtain the desired outcome(s).6 The desired outcome would usually entail a solution 
to a specific problem, where identification of the latter, synonymous with the ‘clari-
fication of the situation’, is a starting point.7
The ‘geopolitical’ implications of connectivity strategies arise from the way the 
logic of connectivity perceives space and “flow”. The inspiration for this approach 
traces back to a “constructal” model of connectivity and nature in terms of the 
law of physics, in which: “For a finite-size flow system to persist in time (to live), it 
must evolve such that it provides greater and greater access to the currents that flow 
through it”.8 This powerful concept models how “flow”, in animate (biological) and 
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inanimate (geophysical) systems, follows universal patterns of generation.9 Control 
over flows, rather than territories, forms the essence of the competition for connec-
tivity in a new hyper-connected multipolar world, where the strategic goal is lever-
age, not domination.10 
This perspective has prompted different actors to devise connectivity strategies to 
advance influence and gain leverage in the global space. So far, the most prominent 
and ambitious example has been the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)11 with 
its two components, the Belt and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI).12 Several 
other connectivity strategies have arisen, namely the Master Plan on ASEAN Con-
nectivity 2025,13 the EU-China Connectivity Platform,14 and the Partnership on Sus-
tainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure Between Japan and the European 
Union. It is interesting to note that even though the language used in all these strategic 
documents emphasizes cooperation and partnership, the EU does not shy away from 
referring to China as a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”.15
To the extent that the globe consists primarily of the oceans, which often serve 
as the most efficient space for transportation and communication, it is not surpris-
ing that much of the connectivity occurs by sea. The term ‘maritime connectivity’ 
might be used to encapsulate these practices.16 According to Zhang and Long, mar-
itime connectivity has two meanings, one referred to as the established international 
maritime cargo transport channel, connecting the coastal ports, which is akin to 
physical connectivity; and the other the maritime collaborative network, which con-
tains elements such as free navigation and safe waterways,”17 clearly underlying the 
institutional aspect of connectivity. Moreover, according to the description given by 
Blanchard and Flint,18 it is evident that much of the ‘maritime connectivity’ occurs 
on land, thus challenging the division into land-based and maritime connectivity. At 
the same time, it is difficult to ignore that maritime connectivity relies on, challenges, 
and develops the law of the sea and ocean governance.
As discussed above, connectivity is far from being exclusively about building phys-
ical infrastructure. An important part of connectivity as a strategy is governance 
(institutional connectivity): giving influence to certain values through development, 
promotion, and the export of norms, rules, standards, and practices. In other words, 
the actor behind the strategy would normally have a vested interest in promoting 
its vision of ‘good governance’ to facilitate connectivity as it suits its interests and 
reflects its values. Needless to say, the ability to set and promote standards of good 
governance equals control, power projection, and leverage.
This perspective appears to be underpinning the vision of connectivity as pro-
moted by the EU.19 The latter commits to engage with China to uphold the rules-
based international order, and at the same time, reproaches China for its selective 
engagement with multilateralism and its different understanding of the rules-based 
international order.20 Competition between different visions of connectivity provides 
ample room for the proactive promotion of alternative governance models. Notably, 
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in the documents that set out the EU’s vision of connectivity, much emphasis is 
placed on fighting climate change, promoting sustainable development, and the 
2030 Agenda.21 Notably, the EU’s normative vision of connectivity and emphasis 
on sustainability may have already affected other visions – an example of a positive 
effect of connectivity competition.22
As such, connectivity as a strategy has transformative potential.23 The role of State 
practice has been acknowledged for its potential to develop international law, but 
comprehensive connectivity strategies, such as the one promoted by the EU,24 have 
much larger leverage to impose such change.25 Thinking in terms of traditionally 
defined levels of governance, connectivity strategies that have transformative poten-
tial can be situated at the sub-global level. Comprehensive visions may be successful 
when operating within a certain scale, but this does not preclude the agency of mul-
tiple other actors or the effect of practices at the regional level.
Connectivity strategies rely on values and principles, and, as such, they can con-
tribute to the development of law. For example, they may facilitate an endorsement 
of more specific definitions to contested terms of human socio-economic inter-
action, which are often imperfectly defined in law. As noted by To Anh Tuan, all 
connectivity strategies refer to ‘maritime security’, without identifying its precise 
scope.26 Given the inherent vagueness of the term,27 one might appreciate the oppor-
tunity connectivity brings to increase maritime security, for example, by providing a 
better understanding of piracy, freedom of navigation, or places of refuge. Although 
comprehensive connectivity strategies are relatively new, and the linkages between 
them and the agencies involved in the practice of international law at the national, 
regional, and global levels may sometimes be underdeveloped, invisible, or simply 
absent, the narrative, logic, or lens of connectivity may help re-imagine the way we 
address pressing issues.
However, one may imagine that the values underpinning different strategies may 
push for more radical change than merely eliminating frictions to the flows. The 
EU’s vision emphasizes sustainability, human rights, and fighting climate change, 
venturing far beyond the promotion of economic interests and seamless flows of 
commerce. 
2.2  Anthropocentric connectivity in the context of places of refuge for ships in 
need of assistance
One area where the EU’s promotion of a comprehensive connectivity strategy and 
its potential to influence global governance can be observed is the context of places 
of refuge,28 where the EU clearly puts significant emphasis on a robust due diligence 
regime and regional cooperation and coordination to achieve a desired outcome: 
maritime safety and protection of the marine environment. 
A place of refuge may facilitate maritime transport and trade, as it provides a 
shelter where a ship can stabilize its conditions to be able to continue with a planned 
Julia Gaunce et al.
226
voyage. At the same time, depending on the conditions of the ship and circum-
stances such as weather and sea conditions, a ship in need of refuge may pose a 
risk of pollution, which may negatively affect the economy and natural environment 
of the coastal State. There are many examples in the past where refuge to ships in 
need of assistance was granted only after considerable delay,29 or where States, act-
ing as sovereigns in their territories, refused to bring these ships to sheltered areas, 
sometimes without even investigating the seriousness of the situation.30 Whereas the 
refusal of refuge in the case of the Castor (2000) fortunately went without any major 
incident,31 in the case of the Prestige (2002), an environmental catastrophe occurred 
and the reports revealed that the disaster could have been minimized had refuge 
been granted.32
LOSC does not address the problem of places of refuge, but it does impose an 
obligation on all States to protect and preserve the marine environment (Article 
192), allowing states to exercise discretion regarding solutions to the problem.33 
In 2003, States adopted the IMO Guidelines,34 a key aspect of which is merely a 
soft-law recommendation for States to establish procedures to receive and act on 
individual requests with a view to ‘authorizing, where appropriate, the use of a suit-
able place of refuge’.35 In this respect, the IMO Guidelines offer a set of risks and 
factors for further consideration. However, the IMO Guidelines essentially oper-
ate as if the request for a place of refuge is of concern to only one coastal State, 
whereas regional cooperation and coordination, as illustrated by the MSC Flaminia 
incident,36 is of critical importance. Moreover, in the absence of concrete, legally 
binding norms, States may bend to political pressure and resort to their sovereignty 
to act – or not – as they see fit without explaining the grounds for their decision,37 
creating unnecessary delays.38 Global interests in environmental protection may thus 
be compromised; and more Castor-like scenarios (rejection without inspection) with 
 Prestige-like outcomes may play out. 
Proposals for an international treaty on places of refuge which would impose 
explicit obligations on States to grant refuge as a matter of principle have already 
been made on several occasions. However, thus far States have been unwilling to 
surrender their sovereignty, and there seems to be nothing to suggest that such a 
proposal will ever be met with success in the future.39 Understandably, bringing 
a stricken ship near the coast of one State may produce for that particular State 
greater environmental and economic damage than for the environment in general. 
If a ship becomes a maritime casualty and starts to leak oil, the coastal State may 
have reasonable grounds to deny entry to a place of refuge to such a ship. However, 
not all scenarios deserve equal treatment (or in fact no treatment). Depending on 
the circumstances of a given situation (e.g. the stability of the ship, the engagement 
of professional salvors, prevailing weather and sea conditions), the coastal State may 
reasonably be expected to honor a place of refuge. Reacting to a situation early and 
seriously enough could lead to environmental damage being prevented altogether. 
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Through the development and promotion of a comprehensive set of norms, values, 
practices, and procedures, the EU strategy could help reimagine the way we go about 
the problem of places of refuge globally.40 EU Directive 2002/59/EC, as amended 
(VTMIS Directive),41 which is largely influenced by the IMO Guidelines,42 trans-
forms some of the IMO recommendations into obligations for EU Member States. 
For example, the coastal State is obliged to provide a formal decision for denying 
refuge,43 and make various preparations in advance, such as predesignating one or 
more specific competent authorities with expertise and power to take independent 
decisions,44 predesignating places of refuge, and drawing up plans for the accommo-
dation of ships in need of assistance.45 If a given State cannot provide a suitable place 
of refuge, it is expected to communicate this to other parties involved. In this respect, 
the EU clearly puts strong emphasis on institutional connectivity through regional 
cooperation and coordination,46 and on the principle of no rejection without inspec-
tion and explanation.47 
There is an ongoing proposal from the EU Member States and relevant industry 
stakeholders for a revision of the IMO Guidelines on Places of Refuge.48 While the 
EU proposal merely concerns amendments to the IMO operational guidelines of 
a non-mandatory nature, it is worthwhile reflecting upon the overall set of actions 
that the EU has taken to achieve the desired outcome, i.e. an effective response to 
the problem of places of refuge. Some developing States cannot afford a robust 
due diligence regime like the EU’s. While imposing an obligation to be prepared in 
advance does seem to be a laudable solution, it could nevertheless require more to 
be done in alleviating financial and technical burdens (infrastructure and capacity 
building). Moreover, certain weaknesses of the current IMO liability and compensa-
tion regime (which is not tailored for issues related to places of refuge) would need 
to be rectified.49 
2.3 Anthropocentric connectivity in the context of energy 
Anthropocentric connectivity in the context of energy can be understood in multiple 
ways and creates connections with other models, especially ecological connectivity. 
One of these understandings envisages the ocean as a space that enables, through 
maritime transportation, international trade of energy goods and the concomitant 
interconnection of global and regional energy markets. The deployment of energy 
installations at sea also allows the interface between ocean and land energy uses and 
users via another layer of the physical interconnection of energy markets through 
submarine cables and pipelines. Developing and maintaining (ocean) connectivity 
that continues to enable trade in energy goods and integration of transboundary 
energy markets is vital to attain the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
7 and 13.50
Given that energy is a critical component to countries’ socio-economic develop-
ment and security, it is nearly impossible to dissociate it from political considerations. 
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In effect, energy connectivity strategies via the oceans inherently entail geopolitical 
implications. The linkage between maritime chocking points (such as the Suez Canal 
and the Strait of Hormuz) and the facilitation of energy trade between energy pro-
ducing and energy importing countries, perfectly illustrates how energy connectivity 
via the oceans triggers geopolitical tensions and alliances. On a regional or more 
local basis, concrete energy projects, such as Nord Stream 2,51 equally exemplify 
this. Ocean-based energy connectivity, geopolitical strategies, and different episte-
mological views influence ocean governance, but such influence does not necessarily 
have to be negative. Arguably, the anthropocentric concern with enhancing energy 
connectivity (particularly regarding offshore renewable energy) can be a catalyst for 
inter-State cooperation, for increased stakeholder involvement, and for the promo-
tion of better ocean governance.
Another perspective interlinks energy with ecological connectivity. The increase of 
offshore energy installations and submarine cables, also known as ocean sprawl, may 
have an impact on marine ecological connectivity – both in terms of functional and 
structural connectivity. Such impacts may occur to different extents across the entire 
life cycle of these installations, spanning the installation, operation, and decommis-
sioning periods. These impacts could be prejudicial or beneficial. According to Bishop 
et al., ocean sprawl may: “(1) creat[e] barriers to the movement of some organisms 
and resources – by adding physical barriers or by modifying and fragmenting habi-
tats; (2) introduc[e] new structural material that acts as a conduit for the movement 
of other organisms or resources across the landscape; and (3) [alter] trophic con-
nectivity.”52 Moreover, Bishop et. al. also note that, in the event of such impacts to 
connectivity, the implications can be even wider, affecting “the genetic structure and 
size of populations, the distribution of species, community structure and ecological 
functioning”.53 Tidal and wave energy are two key examples of energy generation 
that affect hydrodynamics, morphodynamics and ecosystems, and hence have an 
impact on ecological connectivity.54 According to ICES, the deployment of large-
scale offshore renewable energy installations can “result in far-field changes up to 
100 km away”.55 On the other hand, some studies have sustained that anthropogenic 
infrastructures and installations can have a potentially beneficial role in enhancing 
the connectivity of marine species.56 Still, it is noteworthy that there is a lack of scien-
tific evidence on the actual nature (positive/negative), extent, and significance of the 
impacts of energy installations and infrastructures on ecological connectivity. This 
entails that it is necessary to use an ecosystem approach and implement the strategic 
monitoring of the different offshore energy activities to understand more clearly their 
effects on ecological connectivity. Based on such monitoring, and through ecosys-
tem-based marine spatial planning, the placement of these installations/infrastruc-
tures offshore can be done in a way that preserves ecological sustainability in line 
with United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14.57 It also remains to be seen 
what the impact of the BBNJ negotiations and the final instrument (if one is indeed 
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reached) on energy activities on the high seas and protection of marine biodiversity 
for which ecological connectivity is so important, will be.
The double-thread that energy law has with both anthropocentric connectivity 
and ecological connectivity is also reflected in the way the law of the sea (dis)regards 
ocean connectivity in this context. LOSC, as a framework convention, does not pro-
vide significant guidance on (ocean) connectivity, at least not in terms of ecological 
connectivity, and certainly not in terms of energy. Notwithstanding, it is possible 
to read into Article 192 a duty to consider ecological connectivity as a paramount 
factor affecting the health of marine biodiversity. Against this backdrop, it is import-
ant to consider Article 193 in the context of energy, which compels States to exercise 
the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources following the general duty to 
protect and preserve the marine environment expressed by Article 192. From an 
anthropocentric connectivity point of view, the LOSC does provide a regime that 
enables the deployment of energy infrastructures (including submarine cables and 
pipelines) in the different maritime zones,58 a regime that amply enables connec-
tivity via navigation, and a regime that attempts to balance the different interests 
and rights of States. Moreover, the regime of the LOSC is further complemented 
by other international agreements, such as the CBD, which is also relevant in this 
context. Specific regulation of these matters will ultimately fall on each State or 
other forms of regional integration. In the case of the European Union, for example, 
member States developing offshore energy activities must comply with the EU law 
of relevance as well as follow EU’s integrated maritime policy.59 Ensuring anthro-
pogenic connectivity and connectivity across the EU’s internal energy market is a 
key objective enshrined in multiple EU secondary legislation and Article 194 of the 
TFEU. As already highlighted in section 2.1 above, the EU’s vision of connectivity in 
tandem with its strategies for energy production and trade, sustainable development, 
and climate change mitigation can trigger positive effects of promoting governance. 
2.4  Anthropocentric connectivity and the making and applying of rules and 
standards for ships in polar waters
Ships certainly signify ocean connectivity – for example, in terms of shipping 
and sea-borne tourism. Regulation is certainly anthropocentric, insofar as it sets 
out legal parameters for human activities, and because the making and applica-
tion of those rules and standards is itself a human activity. Ships in polar waters 
and their regulation manifest several other anthropocentric connectivities as well. 
First, transnational rules and standards for ships are made and applied in a highly 
inter-connected regulatory landscape. In the case of the Polar Code, such rules 
and standards are made and applied by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), an inter- governmental UN specialized agency, and the private-sector; they 
apply to ships, crews, and ship owners, and make reference to “vulnerable” Arctic 
ecosystems and Arctic coastal and Indigenous people(s).60 Second, such rules and 
Julia Gaunce et al.
230
standards – including, potentially, those originating from nonbinding instruments61 – 
may be incorporated into the public international law framework under the LOSC, 
thus contributing to the parameters of international legal jurisdiction, rights and 
obligations, making them “relevant” even to non-parties to the making of those rules 
and standards.62 Third, ships in polar waters contribute to and sometimes amplify 
global effects, both socio-economic and socio-ecological.63 Human activity drives 
eco-degradation and climate change, changes which are occurring most rapidly in 
polar environments. Such changes facilitate increased polar traffic and resource 
exploitation, with global socio-economic ramifications. They also feed into global 
socio-ecological dynamics, including the impacts of climate change on low-lying and 
developing states.64
All of the above is basis for the perspective that ocean law and regulation needs 
meaningfully to recognize and reflect all of these anthropocentric relationships. 
However, this is not entirely the case. For example, traditionally, the law of the sea 
has conceived anthropocentric ocean connectivity primarily in terms of sovereign 
interests, rights, and obligations relating to military security and “freedoms” of nav-
igation, resource exploitation and trade, rather than the now urgent matter of eco- 
and climate-related security.65 Furthermore, in the regulatory landscape described 
above, institutional and related normative processes enhance certain anthropocentric 
connections – for instance, those that figure traditionally in the law of the sea – and 
disconnect others.66 The latter effect is perhaps most obvious in, though not exclu-
sive to, the partitioning of Arctic Indigenous people(s)’s interests, values, norms, 
rights and expertise – and not exclusively in terms of Indigenous  cosmovisions67 – 
from the making and application of the Polar Code.68 
Short of radical transformation, a broader understanding and actualization of 
anthropocentric connectivity in ocean law and regulation, for the better, could con-
tribute to its (re)orientation toward the material, epistemic and geopolitical chal-
lenges conceived in this project. (Re)thinking would require multiple approaches: 
conceptual frameworks both internal to law – such as global administrative law 
on procedural openness, participation, transparency, and review69 – and external, 
socio-cultural perspectives; historical attention to normative practices and effects; 
critical attention to power, hegemony, distribution, plurality and substantive justice. 
Actualization, in the case of the regulation of ships in polar waters, would mean 
reconfiguring the normative landscape in such a way as to connect what is discon-
nected – most obviously, but not exclusively, with respect to Arctic Indigenous peo-
ple(s) and ecosystems referenced by the Polar Code, and the making and applying of 
such rules and standards from the first instance. 
3 Concluding reflections on values of anthropocentric ocean connectivity
Anthropocentrism is sometimes criticized as prioritizing the human at all cost. 
However, anthropocentric perspectives are various, and can be beneficial in ocean 
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governance. Indeed, it could be said that an anthropocentric perspective cannot be 
transcended in human thought and culture in any case. This article assumes that 
there are circumstances in which anthropocentrism per se can be instrumentally pos-
itive and potentially can serve both human and non-human interests in ocean gov-
ernance. The LOSC, for example, was a result and expression of anthropocentric 
interests, including equity with respect to the world’s oceans, while at the same time 
also providing for the evolution of and connection to more ecologically-centered 
perspectives.  This article, therefore, explores anthropocentric ocean connectivity 
as a matter of perspective. This perspective is pluralistic, recognizing varieties of 
anthropocentric connectivity. 
Each exploration of anthropocentric ocean connectivity in this article points both 
to connectivity’s role in material, epistemic and geopolitical challenges to oceans 
and their governance and to its current and potential virtues for addressing those 
systemic challenges. These cases foreground anthropocentric values, including eco-
nomic development and values that link to other models of connectivity, for exam-
ple, the marine bio-centric and Indigenous cosmo-vision centred models explored 
in this issue. In other words, the anthropocentric ocean connectivities conceived 
here collectively strive to take into account a variety of societal goals and values: 
economic growth, sustainable infrastructure, environmental sustainability, ecology, 
and individual and collective human rights and well-being. 
In the context of strategic ocean geopolitics, anthropocentric connectivity can be 
characterized as a governance strategy that relies on institutional connectivity, and 
that gives effect to certain values through the development, promotion, and export 
of norms, rules, standards, and practices, as a form of control, power projection, and 
leverage. A comprehensive, strategic anthropocentric connectivity, such as the one 
promoted by the EU, may have much larger leverage to impose change and influence 
in the development of international law, e.g. by providing definitions of contested 
terms of human socio-economic interaction embraced by law. One may also imagine 
that the values underpinning different strategies may push for a more radical change 
than merely eliminating frictions to the flows. The EU’s vision emphasizes sustain-
ability, human rights, and fighting climate change ventures far beyond promoting 
economic interests and seamless flows of commerce. 
In the context of places of refuge for ships (distinct from assistance to human 
lives), anthropocentric connectivity may have positive results in bringing States 
together to promote and maintain: institutional connections, infrastructure and 
values connected to maritime safety, protection of the marine environment, and 
maritime transport. Inevitably, in the absence of clear rules to the contrary, the deci-
sion to grant or not to grant refuge to a ship in need of assistance is left to sover-
eign discretion on a case-by-case basis, which means refuge can be refused and the 
aforementioned values compromised.70 The EU could influence the development 
of international law in this area by exporting the decision-making principle of ‘no 
rejection without inspection and explanation’ to other regions as a source of best 
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practice. Improvements in and assistance with capacity building and infrastructure 
investment, combined with a robust regime of due diligence, improved liability and 
compensation regime, should be key to a strategy to produce an effective response to 
the problem globally, or more specifically in developing regions. 
In the context of energy, developing and maintaining ocean connectivity that 
continues to enable trade in energy goods and integration of transboundary energy 
markets is vital to attain United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 7 and 13. 
One positive example of anthropocentric connectivity in terms of the energy market, 
which, in fact, is harvested by humans for humans, is the creation of innovative clean 
energy solutions (Goal 7) to ensure the prosperity of countries while fighting climate 
change (Goal 13). In this regard, anthropocentrism may be an essential catalyst in 
beneficial ocean connectivity.
In the context of making and applying rules and standards for ships in polar 
waters, anthropocentric ocean connectivities contribute both to the challenges faced 
by oceans and their governance and to potential values and mechanisms of change. 
Some characteristics of ocean law and regulation exclude or disconnect certain 
anthropocentric connectivities in decision-making, to the detriment of both oceans 
and people. However, a broadening of the concept and practice of anthropocentric 
connectivity has the potential to help address systemic challenges. Such a broaden-
ing would incorporate, for example: (a) an understanding of how power and law in 
this context contributes to the challenges in a problematic way, (b) an understanding 
of how human activity in polar waters is connected to global social dynamics and 
planetary boundaries, and (c) the actualization of plurality in ocean governance, 
including governance by Arctic Indigenous people(s).
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